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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE L.;SPANGLER, / 
Plaintiff and / 
Respondent, 
/ 
-VS- Case No. 14643 
/ 
MARTIN ALLEN SPANGLER, 
/ 
Defendant and 
Appellant. /
 v 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action of divorce brought by Diane L. 
Spangler, Plaintiff and Respondent, against Martin A. 
Spangler, Defendant and Appellant, wherein action was 
joined by the answer of the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the hearing held in the lower court, the lower 
court granted a judgment of decree of divorce to the 
Respondent making a division of the property of the parties 
and awarding a judgment of child support as against the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant. 
* RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks rehearing on the decree of distri-
bution granted in the lower court by its judgment and in 
the amount of child support awarded to the Respondent by the 
court, alleging an inequitable distribution of the marital 
assets and property and an abuse of discretion by the lower 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, who was the Defendant in the lower 
i 
court, will be referred to in this brief as the "husband," 
and the Respondent, who was the Plaintiff in the lower 
court, will be referred to in this brief as "wife." The 
parties were intermarried in 1968 and have a child five 
years of age, and the wife is employed as a secretary for 
a District Judge in Weber County, (R-3) earning approxi-
mately $700.00 monthly (R-27) with an actual net take 
home income in the sum of $238.40 every two weeks (R-6), 
which computes for an annual take home pay of $6,198.00. 
The wife has a further income monthly from rental 
property in her name in the sum of $100.00 a month. (R-8) 
The parties both met in 1967, at which time the wife had a 
property on Adams Avenue and the husband helped in remodel-
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ling of the property by putting in a fence across the back 
of the property, gravel in the driveway, carpeting in one 
of the apartments, and doing some painting, whereupon the 
husband moved into the bachelor apartment upon its comple-
tion. (R-52) 
Prior to entering into marriage with the wife, the 
husband had acquired a property at 2357 Liberty Avenue, 
in Ogden, Utah, which the husband assigned to his wife prior 
to the marriage. (R-53) The basis of his assigning same 
to the wife was belief that she could handle it better and 
"I loved her very much." (R-53) 
Shortly after assigning the property to the wife, 
the Respondent and Appellant were married, and the husband 
performed work upon the Adams property subsequent to the 
marriage. (R-54) 
Improvements were also made on the Liberty Avenue pro-
perty subsequent to the marriage of the parties hereto (R-54), 
the husband installing wood panelling in the kitchen of 
one of the duplex units of the Liberty Avenue property, 
electrical switches, painted the outside of the house, in-
stalled a new roof on the premises, and put in a shed; 
poured a strip of concrete in the driveway to widen the 
driveway; put a new walkway in front of the premises; 
remodelled the furnace room by enlarging it and putting 
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in a doorway. (R-55) 
Subsequent purchase made by the husband and wife was 
a real estate lot on Harrison Boulevard, which was sold 
subsequently for a net profit of $920.00. (R-14) 
On May of 1972, a property was purchased in Willard, 
which consisted of an acreage, together with a small cottage 
and a garage, which was purchased for $28,000.00. A part 
of the Willard property was sold with the retention of the 
profits from the sale of the property, the wife had her 
father construct a home on the property by borrowing 
$7,774.00 as a mortgage, which represented the costs of 
materials to build the home (R-17) with the wife having 
made an arrangement with her father to pay him one and 
one-half times the cost of material, which is one and 
one-half times $7,774.00 as and for the father's 
labor for construction work of the home constructed on 
the Willard property (R-42), which computes out at $11,661.00 
as and for the labor and services of the wife's father. 
The value of the completed home and the cottage was stipulated 
by the husband and wife to be valued at $33,000.00. (R-19) 
During the entire eight years of the marriage be-
tween the husband and wife, the wife kept all real property 
in her own name. (R-27) 
In the division of the assets by the court, the court 
awarded to the husband the sum of $1,500.00, as and for the 
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husband's share of the equity of all the real property, 
furniture and equipment of the parties, and all the pro-
perty, real and personal, was awarded to the wife with $1,500.00 
becoming due to the husband upon the child reaching majority, 
or the Plaintiff remarrying, or the property being sold. 
(R-80) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DIVISION OF ASSETS EVIDENCE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
During the entire marriage of the parties, the wife 
at all times handled all records and bookkeeping, wrote all 
the checks, and filed the income tax, and paid all bills. 
(R-57) The husband testified that he was working as a 
structural steel worker, and such work required a great 
amount of traveling from job to job, and also while the 
husband was not learned in books, having gone only to high 
school (R-56), the wife had attended two years of college, 
and was also engaged part time in the sale of real estate. 
(R-53) 
Throughout the entire transcript and the testimony of 
the wife, she continuously referred to all of the property as 
"her" property. The record before the court also shows in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, that from the home on Adams Avenue 
and the Liberty property, which was given to the wife by the 
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husband, that the wife had a net income and/or profit of 
$12,300.00 as and from that property, and the wife testified 
that between the summer of 1973 and June of 1975, the husband 
did not contribute any direct money to the payment on the 
house, mortgage, or otherwise, whereas the record reveals 
the income of the husband and wife as follows: 
! Wife testified that she had no earnings in 1971, 
and that the husband earned $5,289.00, in addition to which 
he drew unemployment insurance. (R-25) 
Husband contributed wages in 1972, $9,157.00, plus 
unemployment insurance, and the wife contributed $1,002.00. 
(R-21) 
The husband contributed wages in 1973 of $11,853.00, 
and the wife had earnings of $180.00. (R-21) 
The husband contributed earnings in 1974 in the 
amount of $16,874.00, and the wife had earnings of $2,765.00. 
(R-21) 
The husband fell while on structural steel work and 
suffered injuries, including a broken hand, torn cartilage 
and dislocated disc in the back, and a sprained spine, in 
December, 1974, drawing payment of some Workman's Compensation, 
Unemployment Compensation, and G. I. Bill payments for educa-
tion; in addition to which the husband attempted to get back 
into steel work and making $3,000.00 in an eight week period 
on a job in Wyoming, which in accordance with the defense 
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Exhibit No. 11 shows income for 1975 in the amount of 
$9,570.00, and the wife alleged the income earned in 1975 
in the amount of $2,513.00. (R-22) 
The husband testified that while on all of those 
construction jobs, that he sent his pay checks home either 
by Western Union, or cash, or check (R-24), that the husband 
always sent home everything that he could, varying from none, 
when no employment checks, to $700.00 to $1,000.00 or more. 
(R-63) The husband maintained no private records, and 
in direct answer to a question as to who handled all the 
transactions, the husband replied as follows: 
ANSWER - by husband. I was traveling on con-
struction and I sent it home. She has the 
records of the checks, she writes the checks, 
handles the book work, files the income tax, 
handles the real estate property, pays the 
bills. I don't have - - I wouldn't - - I 
couldn't carry the paper work around with me 
when I was working construction. I kept 
nothing except my clothes and tools. (R-57) 
Following the injury of the husband while on structural 
steel construction in Bismark, North Dakota, in the Fall of 
1974, (R-57), he again attempted to work on steel structural 
construction in Wyoming and again "froze on the steel and 
got hurt * * and ended up in the hospital again." (R-59) 
The husband no longer works in steel work and will attempt 
to seek rehabilitation going back to his original work, which 
was that as a barber (R-59) with the expectations of earning 
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from forty to eighty dollars a week at the business. 
The husband having put the Liberty property in the 
name of his wife, because of his belief that she had greater 
ability as a real estate person than himself, this property 
was subsequently sold for a substantial profit. The amount 
of labor expended by the husband on the Adams property, which 
i 
was the property of the wife prior to marriage, but upon 
which the husband expended a great deal of work and money 
and materials, as was set forth hereinabove previously; the 
use of the husband's income as against the income evidenced 
by the wife's own testimony, as has been hereinabove 
set forth; all evidence that there had to be a community 
property of the husband and wife's used in the purchase of 
the properties which resulted in the profits that were 
made and which were plowed back into the Willard property. 
The Defendant's Exhibit 10 further shows an expendi-
ture of approximately $4,539.00 in money by the husband on 
the Willard property, in addition to whatever use of wages 
that the wife had previously retained, which was sent home 
by the husband, as having been invested in the Willard 
property, plus the testimony of the wife when she claims 
that a mortgage in the amount of $7,706.74 was the total 
cost of materials, that her oral contract and agreement 
with her father for labor was to pay him one and one-half 
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times the cost of material as and for his work (R-42), which 
computes at $11,661.00, was disregarded by the court in 
computing the court's own formula for an award of equity 
to the husband, wherein the court came up with a figure of 
$14,400.00 as a deductible item allegedly owed by the 
wife to her father for labor allegedly performed upon the 
premises (R-83), when the pure mathematical computation 
show that one and one-half times the cost of materials of 
$7,774.00, as $11,661.00, and not $14,400.00. (R-42) 
The mortgage balance on the home and rental pro-
perties at Willard show a balance in the amount of $7,095.00, 
in which the court added the $14,400.00 figure allegedly 
due to the wife's father for labor, and interpreting a part 
of seven to eight thousand dollars of invested monies in 
the Willard property as being that of the wife's only, sub-
tracting same from the accepted figure of $33,000.00 appraised 
value of the property, the court then claimed that left a 
$3,000.00 equity in which the husband would get $1,500.00. 
(R-84) 
The mathematics are directly contradictory to 
the evidence in the record before the court, and is in 
complete disregard of the proportionate earnings of the 
husband and wife which has been previously set forth 
hereinabove. 
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P.2d 743, 
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Supreme Court of Utah (June 1948), this court held that 
when the husband is not in at fault, that the one-third 
to the spouse and two-thirds to the husband is a fair 
division of the property of the marital estate. 
In the instant matter before the court, the hus-
band did not desire divorce and did not seek the divorce, 
but was instituted by the wife (R-2), and in addition, the 
wife requested that the divorce be effective immediately 
upon being decreed, (R-23) 
This court further held in Rackham v. Rackham, 
230 P.2d 566, Supreme Court of Utah (April 1951), that 
in considering the division of the property, that the ill 
health or unemployment of the spouse is a matter to be 
considered. 
It is submitted to this honorable court that at 
the time of the divorce, the husband was not only unemployed, 
but could no longer worked on steel work because of his 
physical injuries and was hopeing to enter into his earlier 
profession of that of a barber wherein the earnings would be 
very nominal (R-59); that the only possessions that the 
husband had were some construction work clothes, and that 
he was not eligible for Unemployment Compensation nor Work-
man's Compensation, and had lost his Ford vehicle by repos-
session (R-66) while the records shows that the wife is 
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employed as a secretary earning approximately $700.00 a 
month (R-5) and having rental income from the Willard pro-
perty. (R-44) 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, 
this court stated: 
The court's responsibility is to endeaver to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of 
their economic resources so that the parties 
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis. In doing so, it is necessary 
for the court to consider, in addition to the 
relative guilt or innocence of the parties, 
an appraisal of all of the attendant facts 
and circumstances; the duration of the 
marriage; the age of the parties; their 
social position and standards of living; 
their health; considerations relative to 
children; the money and property they possess 
and how it was acquired; their capability and 
training and their present and potential 
income. 
It is submitted to this honorable court that applica-
tion of the standards set by the court in the Anderson case 
supra and the present matter before the court, would have 
resulted in at least a fifty percent division of the 
community assets to the husband even accepting the alleged 
oral agreement between the wife and her father as to 
monies due and owing to him for labor and disregarding 
the monies contributed by the husband and labor expended 
by the husband in the construction and remodelling of the 
Willard properties, and in his monetary and labor on the 
previous properties, plus the fact of the transfer of the 
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Liberty property to the wife by the husband. 
This court in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, in 
setting forth the standards of the lower court in evaluating 
the equitable distribution of the marital estate of the 
parties did again place the onus of the party causing 
the breakup of the marriage as a fact to take into con-
i 
sideration and in stating that the trial court has a 
responsibility in formulating a divorce decree to provide 
a just and equitable adjustment of economic resources so 
that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis. 
In the instant matter before the court as of the 
time of the decree, we have a husband who is no longer 
employable in structural steel work or any heavy type of 
labor work because of the injuries which he suffered, who 
was unemployed, who is not eligible for either Workman's 
Compensation or Unemployment Compensation, and who had to 
start a new career again in the only work which he felt he 
was capable of performing because of educational and previous 
training, and that would be in barbering, from which he testi-
fied previously that he would expect to earn about fifty to 
eighty dollars a week when eligible to again become a 
barber, and the court by decree ordering the husband to 
pay $75.00 a month child support while unemployed, and 
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$135.00 a month upon obtaining employment that earned 
$400.00 or more, which order can only result in the wiping 
out of the meager $1,500.00 awarded by the court to the 
husband as his equity in the marital property, or further 
actions to use the contempt powers of the court if the hus-
band should be delinquent in making child support payments. 
| At the same time, the court also awarded to the wife, 
who is earning $700.00 a month plus rental from the 
community marital property, $300.00 in attorney fees to 
be paid by the husband. (R-106-108) 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this honorable court that there 
has been an abuse and discretion of the court in refusing 
to recognize the specific mathematical basis given by the 
wife for the division of the equity of the Willard property, 
and for not taking into consideration the contributions of 
the husband as to earnings and wages, labor and materials 
expended upon the property of the marital community, and 
further by imposing upon the husband an immediate award of 
$75.00 a month child support, plus $300.00 attorney fees, 
when he is totally unemployed, unemployable, and without 
resources and under a serious physical disability at the 
same time that the wife is enjoying a substantial salary 
plus rental income, and the benefits of a practically paid 
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'••h all of the furniture and appliances being 
for home, with all ox 
awarded to the wife. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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